A compromising end
to the smacking debate? Was the Lester
amendment
necessary?
By
Kay Ma, LLB
Introduction
On
The UK smacking debate re-erupted following the case of A v. UK[3]
which raised the issue of whether the UK’s allowance of the reasonable
chastisement defence failed to provide adequate protection of children’s rights
under the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 (ECHR 1950) Article 3
(prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment) and the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC 1989) Articles 19 (state
obligations to protect children from harm) and 37A (worded similarly to ECHR
Article 3). Following this case the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child called for reform of the
In short, the Lester amendment has removed the reasonable
chastisement defence to all charges of ‘assault’ against a child, except in
proceedings before the
In order to fully understand the Lester amendment, ‘assault’,
‘battery’ and ‘common assault’ must be defined.
Clear definitions of ‘assault’ and ‘battery’, with distinctions, can be
found in case-law. Following the
authority of Collins v. Wilcock: ‘An
assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of
immediate unlawful force on his person; a battery is the actual infliction of
unlawful force upon another person.’[8] This is consistent with the dictionary
definitions: ‘Assault: …causes someone to be put in fear of immediate physical
harm…actual physical contact is not necessary.[9]
For the application of the CA 2004 s.58, the distinction between assault and battery is not as important as the distinction between both these charges and common assault. The charge of common assault is normally used where the injuries are merely transient, for example, grazes, minor bruising, reddening of the skin, scratches, superficial cuts or a black eye.[11] However, under the current Crown Prosecution Services charging standards it is possible for these injuries to be charged as assault occasioning actual bodily harm (thus satisfying the CA 2004 s.58(2)(b)) instead of common assault. This may happen where a case involves serious aggravating features including the vulnerability of the victim, such as when the victim is a child and the accused is the parent.[12] Therefore, in cases of alleged assaults on children by their parents, the distinction between common assault (and consequently the valid use of reasonable chastisement) and assault occasioning actual bodily harm (with no such defence) is blurred and it is at the discretion of the prosecutor which charge should be applied. This realisation has caused a stir in the media with headlines reporting “Parents can smack, but not too hard: Peers back compromise that makes it an offence to leave bruise or mark.”[13] It was well-publicised that the Lester compromise had effectively applied a ‘red mark test’ to whether or not a parent had assaulted a child. This state of affairs poses numerous problematic questions arise from this:-
- How long after the alleged assault must a red mark exist constitute assault (especially now that even transient injuries can be assault occasioning actual bodily harm)? ‘The Times’ offered a vague time span of ‘several hours’.[14] No other sources have provided guidance on this issue.
- Who would decide whether the injury is ‘sufficient’?[15]
- Every allegation of assault, no matter how trivial,[16] would be open to investigation; is this effective use of huge amounts of resources which could be directed at more serious allegations?[17]
- The issue of different skin-tones has been neglected. Bruising would show more easily on a white child than a black child; does this mean a black child can be smacked harder?[18]
-
Different levels of child
vulnerability have been ignored.
Children with medical conditions, such as brittle-bone disease, are more
vulnerable to injury; does this mean these children’s parents should be more
vulnerable to prosecution? Research
indicates in 96 cases of
In his attempt to offer a compromise to settle the smacking debate,
Lord Lester has in fact created a ‘fudge’[20]
of the debate by “substituting one area of confusion for another.”[21] The key question is: was the Lester amendment
necessary? This dissertation looks at
three of the main arguments in support of the Lester amendment. Chapter 1 considers whether children should
have equality with adults in assault laws; Chapter 2 deals with the argument
that the law needs to develop to protect children without becoming a nanny
state; and Chapter 3 focuses on the notion that the
My aim is show that it was unnecessary to implement the Lester amendment, and in doing so analyse how far the Lester Amendment goes towards satisfying these arguments and question whether they justify change rather than preservation of the status quo.
This chapter looks at the parent-child relationship and the status of children to determine whether children can and should be afforded equal rights to protection in assault laws as adults, or if there is justification for withholding such rights until they come of age.
1.1. What is meant by ‘equal rights’ in assault
laws?
A recurrent theme in the ‘smacking debate’ is that children should be given ‘equal rights’ to adults in assault laws. Liberals, such as Baroness Walmsley, argue this is only achievable by removing the Victorian defence of reasonable chastisement. This would result in a blanket ban on smacking, which Baroness Walmsley expressly supported[22]. The alternative claim is there already existed the right of children to have equal and sufficient protection from assault,[23] hence the law merely needs to change in order to provide recognition of this.[24] The underlying question is not can children have equal rights to adults (in assault laws), but rather should they?
Should the law, like the state, view a parent smacking his/her child in the exact same light as an adult smacking an adult? Lord Cameron made reference to criminal law’s requirement to look at intent and how the CA 2004 s.58(2) ignores this requirement. He pointed out that by looking at the context of a ‘smack’, it can be seen that parents “may have to make a quick decision about what is about to happen”.[25] Therefore, smacking can be an instinct or reaction in response to a child’s actions rather than an intention to cause harm such as in some cases of adult-to-adult brawls. The intention, or rather the context behind a smack, is as important as the discussion as to whether children are/should be of equal status to adults regarding protection in assault laws.
1.2. The context of the administration of the
smack (‘assault’)
1.2(a) Different relationships, different contexts
Granting equality to incomparable situations would defy logic. For this reason, one must consider whether a parent-child smack is comparable to an adult-adult smack before concluding whether a child should have the same rights to protection as adults are entitled to in assault laws in all situations (including a smack from their parent). It would be naïve of the law to take all smacks, whether they be adult-to-adult or parent-to-child, at face-value and group them all as ‘simply a smack’.
Lord Lester contends that “the context is different when a parent smacks their child from when an adult smacks another adult. It is important for the law to recognise this common-sense difference.”[26] I agree with Lord Lester on this point and submit that far too often anti-smacking campaigners view parental smacking only in the context of inflicting pain. For instance, the ‘Children Are Unbeatable Alliance’ used children picketing with signs and t-shirts reading ‘Don’t smack, it hurts’ at the forefront of their rallies. The Law needs to be wary of ignoring parental smacking in the contexts of i) parental discipline and ii) protection of children.
1.2(a)(i) Parental discipline
The context of parental discipline embraces the unique relationship a parent has with their child. Since the enactment of the Children Act 1989 s.3 there has been a shift from basing the parent-child relationship on the rights a parent has over his/her child[27] to recognising instead a parent owes responsibilities to his/her child. Prior to this shift a parent could effectively advocate s/he had a right to discipline his/her child.[28] It is harder, yet not impossible, to make the same claim when the parent appears to owe responsibilities to his/her child rather than have rights over the child. The Children Act 1989 s.3 states that ‘[for the purposes of the Act] ‘parental responsibility’ means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.’ The fact that the first word used in the description is rights suggests it is incorrect to insinuate parents have no rights at all.[29] Therefore, the right to discipline can arguably be interpreted as falling within the definition of ‘parental responsibility’.
The 1989 Act does not provide a list of specific responsibilities owed to a child by their parent. This in itself seems to indicate that the law recognises the relationship between a parent and his/her child is unique from any other. In contrast, the government does not hold back in identifying the duties and responsibilities local authorities owe to children under Schedule 2 of the 1989 Act. A much more ‘hands-off approach’ has been used with regards to the parent-child relationship, allowing for the maintenance of parents’ freedom to decide what responsibilities they owe to their children.
Does ‘common sense’ not suggest parents should have a responsibility to teach their children right from wrong (i.e. to discipline their children)? Pringle suggests children have a right to become responsible adults and that without adequate parental care there is little chance of fulfilment of this right[30]. The concurrent assumption is the ‘responsible adult’ knows right from wrong. Earl Howe draws a distinction in Parliamentary debate that smacking a child to teach right from wrong is not the same thing as child abuse.[31] Anti-smacking campaigners believe children can be taught right from wrong by reasoning with them instead of smacking them. This belief does not consider the level of understanding children have as to how serious ‘wrong behaviour’ is when they are merely told it is wrong. Research into communication has shown that only 7% of all communication is verbal[32], thus all actions have a context of communicating a message: why should smacking not be recognised also for conveying a message? It has been argued that physical punishment is the only ‘language’ a child can understand[33] and for this reason smacking is a tool for communicating right from wrong to a child. Thus discipline provides the context of the smack.
Where a smack is in the context of disciplining one’s own child, it cannot be made comparable to an adult hitting another adult. A parent has a responsibility to discipline his/her child; a responsibility which clearly does not exist between two adults.
1.2(a)(ii)
A parent protecting his/her child
The classic example of a smack in this context is the ‘child running into the road’ scenario. As is discussed above, a smack may be the most effective ‘language’ for a parent to use in this scenario. Small children may not always appreciate the degree of harm that running into the road can cause. The likelihood of a small child digesting a parent’s attempt to verbally reason with him/her about the dangers is minimal compared to the likelihood of the same child understanding a smack meant s/he should not run into the road. Indeed, reasoning does not work with many adults: how many adults can honestly say they avidly listen to the flight attendant’s emergency procedures talk at the beginning of a flight? How many adults are actually thinking of the first thing they want to do when they arrive at their final destination instead? The expectation that children will pay a level of attention which many adults cannot sustain is unrealistic.
Lord Lester asserted: ‘A smack by a loving and anxious parent whose child has run into the road for the fifth time, despite repeated warnings, is not to be equated with a minor act of violence against an adult. Both involve battery but the context is different.’[34] This comment rightly gives consideration to instances when non-physical warnings to a child are ineffective. A parent has a responsibility, in addition to a natural instinct, to protect his/her child by any means possible. Such a responsibility does not exist in the context of an adult-adult relationship. An action with the intention of preventing harm should not be viewed in the context of intending to cause harm.
1.2(b)
Common law requirement to look at the context
It has been accepted at common law that the context of a smack allegedly occasioning ‘assault’ cannot be overlooked in considering whether or not the smack was unreasonable.[35] Thus the importance of establishing the context behind smacking a child has been recognised on some level by the law.
In A v. UK,[36] the European Court of Human Rights held that to prove whether physical chastisement of a child by the parent has reached a level breaching the ECHR Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman/degrading treatment/punishment), four factors need to be taken into consideration: first, the nature and context of the ‘ill-treatment’; secondly, the duration; thirdly, the physical and mental effects; and finally, in some cases, the victim’s age, gender and state of health.[37] Three years later in R v. H[38] the Court of Appeal held that judges should direct juries in accordance with these factors (with the additional consideration of the defendant’s reason for administering the punishment) in deciding whether a parent has reasonably chastised his/her child.
There is evidence to suggest the Government has recognised this test, which includes looking at the context behind the smack, and steps had been taken to bring legislation in line with the Common Law. This was expressed in the January 2000 Consultation Paper ‘Protecting Children, Supporting Parents: A Consultation Document on the Physical Punishment of Children’, where it was reiterated that on deciding whether or not reasonable chastisement was an admissible defence a court should always have regard for the four factors mentioned in A v. UK. This is looked at in more detail in Chapter 3.
If the law appreciates the importance of ascertaining, understanding and taking account of the contexts behind smacks administered by parents to their children, it should also realise these contexts are special to the unique relationship between a parent and his/her child and do not exist in the normal adult-adult relationship.[39] With this in mind, it is suggested that ‘minor assaults’ in a parent-child relationship and an adult-adult relationship cannot be compared.
1.3. The status of children
Children
have come a long way from the “wholly subservient and dependent” being that
Holt described to be “seen by older people as a mixture of expensive nuisance,
slave and super-pet.”[40] Yet it is still questionable whether the
status of children today can conceivably be equal to the status of adults. Liberals such as Baroness Walmsley,[41]
who claims ‘giving children equal protection to that enjoyed by adults under
laws on assault is a policy whose time has come’, insist that child status
should be equivalent to adult status.
A popular area upon which commentators have debated the equality of child and
adult status is in the right to autonomy.
Eekelaar describes autonomy as “the most dangerous but precious of
rights: the right to make their own mistakes.”[42] The justification for not allowing children
to exercise the full right to autonomy is to maximise their autonomy in their
adult life.[43] The choices one makes at childhood would have
an impact on the choices available to one as an adult. For example, a child may choose to eat
McDonalds everyday which would affect his/her opportunity of a healthy adult
lifestyle. From this justification it
can be construed that adult status rightly holds greater importance and value
than child status: autonomy of children
must be limited for the sake of their future adult autonomy.
The question of a child’s autonomy was approached at common law in Re Angela Roddy (A Minor),[44] where the issue was whether children could exercise for themselves the rights they have under the ECHR. Re Roddy specifically concerned ECHR Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life). This drew attention to whether children’s rights and the way children see them should be taken seriously or if children should be treated as ‘largely passive objects.’[45] There was no clear yes or no answer reached in the case which followed the Gillick[46] principle: ‘most wise parents relax their control gradually as the child develops…[so the] degree of parental control actually exercised over a particular child does in practice vary considerably according to his understanding and intelligence’.[47] The case of Gillick itself saw the contention between rights of a child and of her parent on the issue of consent to receiving medical advice and treatment. The case introduced a more liberal view of child status and shifted the boundaries between parents’ rights and children’s rights in accordance with the intellectual maturity of the child. Following Gillick’s precedent, Re Roddy suggests children can acquire equivalent rights to adults but first the court must look to their age, understanding and maturity. Whilst this logic applied to the facts of Re Roddy it would be absurd to apply the same to assault laws. The law cannot assert it is a true reflection of ‘human development and social change’[48] to give children who have reached a certain age, understanding and maturity equal rights to adults in assault laws and leave younger children of a lower understanding and maturity susceptible to ‘assaults’ protected by the reasonable chastisement defence. On the other hand, it would be equally impractical to allow all children equal rights to adults in assault laws, as not every child would have the understanding and maturity to exercise such rights, thus contravening the Gillick principle.
No matter how intellectually mature or sufficient a child’s knowledge of the circumstances surrounding them is, a child is still not fully developed mentally (or physically). One only has to look to the education system to see this; if a child is considered to have reached full mental development once s/he appears ‘mature enough’, it would not make sense to impose compulsory education on every child under 16. Some commentators, like Purdy[49], go as far as to claim children are irrational in comparison to adults. According to Purdy, children’s “alleged irrationality justifies protecting them in ways that also limit their freedom”[50] and according to O’Neill “their fundamental remedy is to grow up.”[51] Children do not have equal mental capacity to adults, so it would be illogical to give them equal status and rights. Another commentator, Burrows, drew attention to the classic definition of a ‘right’ as ‘the freedom to act without interference, according to one’s conscience’.[52] Therefore, conferring a right to a child serves no purpose if by nature children lack the experience and mental capacity to act upon their right.[53] Children are simply not mentally equipped to exercise rights equal to those afforded to adults.
With
equal rights come equal responsibilities.
If children are to receive equal protection to adults in assault laws,
by virtue of the same arguments that instated equal protection children should
be equally responsible for actions classified as ‘assault’. Will children be able to take their
classmates as well as their parents to court for smacking? Children under the age of 10 escape criminal
responsibility because it is believed they are too young to know right from
wrong. A legal system that identifies
young perpetrators as too young to know it is ‘wrong’ to smack and young
victims as old enough to know it is ‘wrong’ to smack, is far from being a fair
one. It tips the balance and provides
better protection for children than adults.
1.4. Conclusion
After analysing the contexts behind smacking, the statuses of children and adults, and the possible outcomes of giving children equal rights to protection as adults in assault laws, it is submitted that such equality is unworkable. The contexts behind parents smacking their children are incomparable with the contexts of adults smacking other adults. The parent-child relationship places responsibilities on parents which they do not owe other adults, thus even the relationships between a parent and child and an adult and another adult are incomparable. The status of children should not be seen as simply inferior to that of an adult. It should, however, be noted that children have a dependent status on adults which they eventually grow out of in a process leading to equal status upon adulthood.
It
is interesting to note a key question which has only been mentioned once in
Parliamentary debates: “What do we mean
by the current adult law?”[54] Baroness Walmsley drew attention to this and
made the point of if she were to smack Lady Sharp (sat next to her) on the arm,
it would be an assault but she would not end up in court being charged for it. She went on to declare “that is the way the
adult law operates, and that is how we expect the law to operate for children
as well. We are asking for equality – no
more and no less.”[55] If that is the definition of ‘equality with
adults in assault laws for children’, why change the law at all? The defence of reasonable chastisement
achieves the same result as that mentioned by Baroness Walmsley; a smack on the
arm, albeit an ‘assault’, would not lead to being charged with assault in court
were it considered to be reasonable. The
absence of case law regarding the charging of parents in court for ‘assaulting’
their child by smacking their arm in such a way indicates this to be unchanged
for parent-child smacks.
It seems the equality debate is really a reflection of the rights-based society
the
Turning more specifically to whether Lord Lester’s compromise gives children equal rights to protection as adults in assault laws, it is submitted that the Lester amendment has merely confused the status of children in assault laws rather than confer equality to children. ‘Children’s rights are not promoted if adults merely deliver a rough approximation of what children need, based on their own prejudices.’[58] The compromise Lord Lester offered and the government accepted was ‘a rough approximation’. It is the government’s opinion that children will benefit from the reform which will eventually escalate to a ban on smacking. As discussed in this chapter, it is suggested that this government rough approximation will do nothing to benefit the well-being of children.
This chapter looks at the main political concern (fear of the nanny state) for opting for a ‘compromise’ instead of a ban or preservation of status quo. By exploring the definition of ‘nanny state’ and the ideology behind it, I aim to show that the Lester amendment does not fully extinguish the threat of the nanny state.
2.1 Introduction to the terms ‘nanny state’ and
‘constructive partnership’
In the 1980s, Bernard Levin expressed his frustration over ‘the erosion of civil liberties disguised as benevolent government’ by coining the term ‘nanny state’.[59] Twenty years later the media adopted vigorous use of this term by reporting on the political concerns relating to ‘nanny state’ accusations in the events leading up to the enactment of the Lester amendment.[60] Following the introduction of the Lester amendment, ‘The Telegraph’ reported on concerns the Labour Party had over possible accusations of being a nanny state in the run-up to a general election.[61] Once the Children Bill 2004 was given royal assent (with the Lester amendment included), ‘The Telegraph’ produced another article stating: “The accusation of ‘nannying’ is one that has alarmed Labour strategists as research shows it to be a potent gripe among voters.”[62]
The
alternative to the ‘nanny state’ offered by members of the House of Lords, such
as Baroness Walmsley and Lord Laming, is for the state to ‘work constructively
in partnership with parents / families.’[63] Put into practice would ‘constructive
partnership’ differ enough from a nanny state to constitute an
alternative? One could construe the
terms ‘nanny state’ and ‘constructive partnership’ as the same idea expressed
in two languages; the Parliamentary use of ‘working in partnership with
parents’ translates to ‘progressing towards a nanny state.’
2.2 Ideology: State Paternalism
It is clear that the government’s main objective is to place priority on the interests of the child. This keeps the law within the ambit of the Children Act 1989 s.1 and the main intention of the Children Act 2004, to recognise the paramount importance of the welfare of each child. The issue is how far the government will go to achieve this objective. Will the interests of the parent become subordinate to the interests of the child? This idea of placing greater importance on the interests of children is acquiescent with the ideology of ‘state paternalism’.
It follows naturally that should the child’s interests be given high priority, the rights and liberties of the parent are subjugated. The welfare of the child is paramount; if the parents’ interests stand in the way of meeting this end it would be suffice and acceptable in the state’s view to subjugate the parents’ interests. The interests of the child are invariably considered to be the public interest according to Baroness Finlay,[64] therefore under the state paternalism model ensuring the welfare of the child is the responsibility of adults acting not as parents, but as ‘agents of the state’.[65] Parenthood is no longer a reward but a duty to the state. The paternalist state is the ‘nanny state’.
The problem with state paternalism is that every child, no matter how loving their home is, is automatically seen as child needing to be rescued. Depicting children as dependent and needy is the state’s justification for intervening as the children’s ‘hero’.[66] The state takes on the parental duty (or paternal role) of protecting children. The paternalist state is meant to be neutral and wise, rather than controlling and oppressive. This would be true if society was entirely equal with no class distinctions and variations of cultural attitudes. State judgement is not universal; the state decision-makers are those with most influence: the professionals, the courts and the ‘experts’. There is no place for parent autonomy in the paternalist state.
Pringle supports the paternalist state claiming: ‘society suffered
from misplaced faith in blood-ties and over-romanticised picture of
parenthood…children should be seen rather as only on temporary loan to parents
[not possessions]...Bringing up children is too important a task to be left
entirely to those parents who are patently in need of support and guidance.’[67] In response to this argument, what makes the
state more qualified than parents to determine how a child should be brought
up? The state cannot dictate how parents
choose to raise their children on a daily basis like it dictates how people
should behave at work. Setting
guidelines on how to perform at work improves the state’s economy, if the state
sets guidelines on how to parent it implies that children are owned by the
state in the same way the economy is.
This contradicts the principle behind the Children Act 1989 that
children are not possessions.[68] If children are treated as property, they are
at the mercy of the ‘owner’ who may not always be ‘prepared to facilitate a
child’s growth towards self-determination and independence’, this is the point
made by
2.2(a) State Paternalism and the Smacking Debate
Dingwall et al[70] concluded that state paternalism applied a ‘strict liability approach’ to assessing child abuse. Nearly all injuries to children are perceived as ‘unequivocal evidence of neglect or abuse and of deficiency in the parents’.[71] Only clinical evidence has relevance in assessing abuse, not the social evidence. The impact this has on smacking, is that under the paternalist state regime, any physical evidence of a child having been smacked could equate to an assumption that the parent has abused the child. There is no regard for factors such as the child’s behaviour and the environment the child is being brought up in. One could argue the Lester amendment is similar to state paternalism in that it relies on physical evidence (such as reddening of the skin) to indicate abuse of a child by their parent, rather than considering why the alleged assault happened.
State paternalism attempts to justify ‘nannying’ by broadening the
concept of abuse.[72] The Lester amendment effectively does
this. The concept of unreasonable punishment
of children has been broadened to include assault and battery (except common
assault), which inevitably leads to more state intervention in order to police
this broader concept. The test for
whether assault or battery has occurred is whether or not there is a red mark
left on the child; Professor Leon Polney (
2.3 A political agenda behind opting for a
‘compromise’ instead of a ban?
How is the Lester ‘compromise’ preferable to an outright ban? There is a slight political difference between the two which made the Lester amendment safer for the government. The Department of Health concluded that any legislative attempts to outlaw physical punishment of children is a ‘heavy-handed intrusion into family law’[76] and would ‘victimise parents unfairly and compromise public confidence in the system.’[77] Therefore a ban carries the risk of ‘nanny state’ accusations. By contrast, the Lester compromise, is not overtly a ‘nanny state’ and thus retains some public confidence in the government, whilst discreetly stepping towards the nanny state. If the government truly wanted to avoid the nanny state, status quo should have been preserved as this would not have required heavier state intervention.
2.4 Conclusion
Returning to Levin’s definition of the ‘nanny state’ at the beginning of this chapter, I submit that the Lester amendment satisfies the definition. The civil liberties of parents in compliance with the ECHR Article 8 (the right to a private family life) have been eroded by a compromise proclaiming to protect children whilst not intervening with how parents wish to bring up their children. The benevolent government does not intrude on the parent-child relationship, however, it does protect people from crime. By broadening the scope of criminal offences, the Lester amendment disguises intrusion on how parents wish to bring up their children as protection of children from becoming ‘victims of crime’. This disguise is reflective of the state paternalism principle of justifying state intervention (or the nanny state) by broadening the scope of abuse.
In the next chapter,
3. The European Influence
This
chapter looks at two points of influence from
3.1.
Subsequent to its 1979 ban on smacking, one could say
The recurring arguments in favour of following Sweden are: a) the
effectiveness of the non-punitive approach which protects children, supports
parents and educates both;[81]
b) the low mortality rates linked to child abuse in Sweden[82];
and c) statistics inferring a decrease in assault and battery of children
behind closed doors.[83] This chapter seeks to show these arguments
when explored in depth suggest the Swedish ban on smacking is not all it boasts
to be and the
It is concerning that throughout Parliamentary debates the above
arguments were put forward by the Lords and subsequent arguments against a ban
were not. Among arguments idolising
Professor
Larzelere’s article ‘Sweden’s smacking
ban: more harm than good’[87]
uses the same data as pro-Swedish ban commentator, Durrant[88],
to demonstrate four areas revealing failure of the smack ban culture that
threatens to spread across Europe.
First, he contends that attitudes and practices relating to ‘corporal
punishment’ of children have not changed since the 1979 ban.[89] Secondly, recorded physical abuse has
increased.[90] Thirdly, numbers of child perpetrators of
assault crimes against children are higher in the generation brought up with a
smacking ban.[91] Finally, the ‘support’ offered to parents is more like intrusion forced upon parents.[92] These four areas will be expanded upon to
illustrate future problems overlooked by the
3.1(a) The effectiveness of the
‘non-punitive’ approach
The crux of the alleged ‘success’ of
Larzelere used statistics obtained between 1965 and 1994 to illustrate the insignificant change post-ban.